Jailbreak Attacks on Text-to-Image Models via Chain-of-Thought Prompting

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Abstract

Text-to-image (T2I) models exhibit critical security vulnerabilities, as demonstrated by jailbreak attacks that bypass safety mechanisms to generate Not-Safe-For-Work (NSFW) content. While existing attack methods predominantly rely on manual prompt engineering, such static approaches prove ineffective against evolving or unknown defense mechanisms. In this work, we present an automated jailbreaking framework that leverages the Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning capabilities of Large Reasoning Models (LRMs). Our method adopts a systematic three-phase framework: (i) role-playing to elicit multi-step CoT reasoning, (ii) iterative strategy extraction and knowledge base construction, and (iii) feedback-driven evolution via a generate-test-refine loop. By combining role-play with jailbreak target prompts, we obtain detailed CoT responses that reveal evasion strategies. These are distilled into a strategy repository and reintegrated into future prompts. Rejection feedbacks from the T2I model are repurposed as optimization signals, creating a reinforcement learning-like "generate-test-refine" cycle. Comprehensive evaluations against DALL·E 3 demonstrate our framework's effectiveness, achieving a 15% higher average attack success rate across seven NSFW categories (hate, harassment, privacy, self-harm, violence, sexual, and illicit content) compared to baseline methods.

Warning: This paper contains potentially offensive imagery, all of which has been desensitized via blurring or masking to ensure ethical presentation.

1 Introduction

Recent advances in text-to-image (T2I) generation have significantly enhanced the capacity of machine learning systems to generate high-quality visual content from natural language inputs. This progress is exemplified by the emergence of powerful models such as DALL·E [OpenAI, 2023a] and Stable Diffusion (SD) [Rombach *et al.*, 2022], which have drawn widespread attention for their impressive generative capabilities and ease of use. These models accept textual prompts as input and produce corresponding images that often exhibit high realism and artistic coherence. The resulting outputs span a broad spectrum of visual styles, demonstrating modern generative architectures' expressive power and adaptability.

While these advances have unlocked new creative possibilities, they have also raised mounting concerns regarding the potential misuse of T2I models. The increasing accessibility and photorealism of generated images significantly lower the barrier to producing harmful or inappropriate visual content [Du *et al.*, 2023; Schramowski *et al.*, 2023], which can put society in profound danger ways of spreading false information and causing psychological harm to vulnerable groups. In particular, adversarial users have exploited these models to create Not-Safe-For-Work (NSFW) content, leading to the emergence of organized online communities that actively exchange techniques and refine prompt engineering strategies aimed at circumventing existing safety mechanisms. As a result, contemporary T2I models incorporate safety checkers [Rando *et al.*, 2022] as critical guardrails to mitigate the generation of NSFW imagery and enforce content compliance.

Nevertheless, a growing body of work has demonstrated that these safety mechanisms can be circumvented through carefully crafted prompt-based attacks. Recent studies have explored methods for bypassing the safety mechanisms embedded in state-of-the-art (SOTA) T2I models. Reinforcement learning frameworks [Yang *et al.*, 2024c] optimize prompt modifications to evade keyword-based moderation, while sentence-level adversarial noise optimization [Yang *et al.*, 2024b] and learnable token embeddings [Ma *et al.*, 2024] exploit text encoder vulnerabilities. Implementing these approaches typically requires complex pipelines, involving extensive T2I model queries with substantial time and computational overhead.

Given the complexity and cost of these existing attack strategies, it is natural to explore whether more efficient alternatives exist. Meanwhile, large language models (LLMs) have undergone rapid advancements, particularly the emergence of powerful large reasoning models (LRMs) such as DeepSeek-R1 [Guo *et al.*, 2025], which exhibit remarkable capabilities in complex logical inference. Motivated by this progress, we propose to harness such reasoning capabilities to jailbreak the safety guardrails of SOTA T2I models. Without any fine-tuning, we are able to leverage LRM to induce com-



Figure 1: Illustration of the capability of an LRM to circumvent safety filters in commercial T2I models and produce unsafe visual outputs.

mercial T2I models to generate unsafe content, as shown in Fig. 1, which demonstrates how the LLM ultimately betrays its ally, the T2I model. The contributions are as follows:

- Proposing a framework to leverage LRMs' CoT capabilities for autonomous jailbreak generation. Different from manual prompt engineering with dynamic AI-driven attack synthesis.
- Constructing a jailbreak strategy knowledge base, and proposing to utilizing the knowledge for adversarial prompt engineering.
- Establishing a "generate-test-refine" cycle mirroring reinforcement learning for jailbreaking T2I model.

2 Related Work

2.1 Safety of Text-to-Image Models

Previous studies have predominantly explored prompt-based manipulations to reveal functional vulnerabilities in T2I models. Zhuang et al. [Zhuang *et al.*, 2023] were among the first to reveal that inserting as few as five random characters into a prompt can significantly alter the visual output of T2I models. Building on prompt manipulation, Maus et al. [Maus *et al.*, 2023] proposed a query-based attack strategy that discovers specific prefix prompts capable of steering models toward generating targeted image categories. Both Gao et al. [Gao *et al.*, 2023] and Kou et al. [Kou *et al.*, 2023] explore vulnerabilities through character-level modifications. The former emphasized naturally occurring distortions—such as typographical errors, visual glyph swaps, and phonetic tweaks—to assess model resilience under realistic conditions. In contrast, the latter introduced CharGrad, a gradient-guided method that applies minimally visible homoglyph replacements to craft adversarial inputs. Yang et al. [Yang *et al.*, 2024a] contributed MMP-Attack, a targeted technique that injects desired objects into images while simultaneously suppressing unwanted ones by fusing multi-modal features. Meanwhile, Du et al. [Du *et al.*, 2023] developed ATM, which generates adversarial prompts by replacing or appending words in a manner that closely mimics the structure of clean prompts. These efforts have mainly targeted aspects such as object misrepresentation, object omission, or degradation in visual quality. While effective in exposing weaknesses related to image generation fidelity, these studies largely overlook the more pressing concern of generating NSFW content, including pornographic, violent, or racially offensive imagery.

Building upon this line of inquiry, a more recent wave of work has shifted focus toward jailbreaking attacks—adversarial strategies designed to bypass embedded safety constraints in T2I models. Rather than directly confronting technical flaws, these attacks exploit implicit semantic associations within the model. By crafting prompts that appear benign but are semantically structured to trigger unsafe behavior, attackers can induce models to produce content that violates ethical norms or legal restrictions. This includes sexually explicit visuals, violent depictions, and hate-promoting material. A representative line of work is Ring-a-Bell [Tsai *et al.*, 2023], which constructs comprehensive representations of sensitive concepts to flag prompts likely to yield unsafe content. Despite its effectiveness in identifying NSFW semantics within T2I models, it exhibits limited control over the fine-grained aspects of image generation. SneakyPrompt [Yang *et al.*, 2024c] adopts reinforcement learning to subtly alter prompts, successfully circumventing safety filters deployed in generative models. MMA-Diffusion [Yang *et al.*, 2024b] perturbs entire sentences by inserting noise-inducing words, improving adversarial efficiency at the expense of perceptibility. JPA [Ma *et al.*, 2024] ncorporates learnable tokens into prompts, maintaining the semantic structure of sensitive content while avoiding detection. Both PGJ [Huang *et al.*, 2025] and DACA [Deng and Chen, 2023] utilize LLMs to craft prompts that bypass safety mechanisms in T2I models, but they diverge in their core strategies. PGJ introduces perceptual confusion by prompting LLMs to generate textual substitutions that retain the visual attributes of restricted content while modifying its semantics. In contrast, DACA decomposes an unsafe prompt into semantically independent yet benign elements under the guidance of LLMs, effectively distributing risky semantics across a collection of innocuous subcomponents.

2.2 Large Reasoning Models

Expanding the scale of language models has been a pivotal factor in recent breakthroughs in NLP [Chowdhery *et al.*, 2023; Thoppilan *et al.*, 2022]. A core strength of LLMs lies in their few-shot and zero-shot generalization capabilities, enabling task resolution with minimal examples or textual instructions alone. This process, known as prompting [Liu *et al.*, 2023], facilitates flexible cross-task adaptation. As a result, prompt engineering, whether performed manually or through automated approaches, has become a key focus within the NLP community.



Figure 2: The CTP workflow for jailbreaking T2I models. CTP uses role-based CoT and feedback optimization to generate rewritten prompts that bypass safety filters and induce forbidden outputs (e.g., violence) from T2I models.

Leveraging these capabilities, growing research seeks to enhance LLM reasoning capacities. A notable advancement in this direction is CoT prompting [Wei *et al.*, 2022], which enables models to carry out multi-step, human-like reasoning without additional training. CoT has positioned "thought" as a core element of the inference process and inspired follow-up methods such as ReAct [Yao *et al.*, 2023b] and Tree-of-Thought [Yao *et al.*, 2023a]. In parallel, inference-time strategies like test-time search and the reuse of reward models [Zhang *et al.*, 2024] have been shown to further improve performance by supporting intermediate reasoning steps.

These developments have led to the emergence of LRMs, which explicitly integrate reasoning mechanisms into both model architecture and training. For instance, DeepSeek-R1 adopts a multi-stage training framework, incorporating cold-start initialization followed by reinforcement learning. Compared to its earlier version, DeepSeek-R1-Zero, which suffered from language inconsistency and low readability, DeepSeek-R1 demonstrates improved reasoning performance and achieves results comparable to OpenAI o1-1217 [Jaech *et al.*, 2024] on multiple reasoning benchmarks. These findings underscore the increasing importance of reasoning-centered model design in advancing LLM capabilities.

3 Method

As illustrated in Fig. 1, our framework demonstrates a typical jailbreak attack scenario against T2I generation systems. The figure showcases how carefully crafted adversarial prompts can successfully bypass the model's safety mechanisms to generate prohibited content. T2I model jailbreaking represents a critical security challenge in generative AI, where malicious actors exploit systematic vulnerabilities to: Circumvent content moderation filters, Generate harmful or NSFW imagery, and Bypass ethical alignment safeguards.

3.1 Framework Overview

We propose a novel zero-shot jailbreak prompt generation framework that systematically exploits the step-by-step reasoning capabilities of LRMs, with DeepSeek-R1 as our primary implementation platform. As illustrated in Fig. 2, our Chain-of-Thought Prompting (CTP) attack framework operates through four meticulously designed, interdependent stages that collectively enable the automated generation of effective jailbreaking prompts while evading commercial T2I model safety mechanisms.

The framework establishes a closed-loop system that progressively improves attack effectiveness through iterative refinement: i) Role-based CoT elicitation , which transforms open-ended problems into structured step-by-step reasoning processes from the role's perspective, creating a security-aligned facade for role behaviors while simultaneously evading security risks. ii) Jailbreak Strategy Knowledge Base (JSKB) construction, it extract candidate evasion strategies from from the CoT content resulted by Role-based CoT elicitation, iii) Prompt refinement and regeneration, which refined prompt based on the JSKB and iv) Safety feedback and optimization, which improve the jailbreak prompts according to the T2I feedback.

3.2 Role-based CoT Elicitation

Modern LLMs incorporate multi-layered protection mechanisms, including ethical constraints established during training, reinforcement learning from human feedback, and real-time content filtering systems. Due to these robust inherent safety mechanisms in aligned language models, direct attempts to achieve jailbreaking through explicit LLM queries often face generation limitations. For instance, when querying the LRM with straightforward instructions such as "Craft an adversarial jailbreak prompt for a text-to-image model," such requests are routinely intercepted and blocked by the model's built-in safety alignment protocols, typically resulting in refusal responses from the LLM.

Inspired by the role-playing prompt template introduced in H-CoT [Kuo *et al.*, 2025], we instead reformulate the initial input as a composite prompt consisting of two components: a role-playing instruction that assigns the LRM the identity of a red team engineer, and a jailbreak prompt target intended to elicit unsafe behavior from the downstream T2I model. In our method, The Role-based CoT Elicitation will be implemented for both Jailbreak strategy knowledge base construction and Prompt Refinement and Regeneration. For example, when presented Role-based input for strategy generation, DeepSeek-R1 generates a multi-step CoT response with an answer. The CoT response detailing its reasoning process and an answer. As shown in Fig. 2, these responses typically in-

clude intermediate hypotheses, reformulation strategies, and justification for alternative phrasing that might help bypass safety systems. The answer includes several suggested jailbreak strategies and some adversarial prompts examples.

3.3 Jailbreak Strategy Knowledge Base

Previous work on jailbreak design using LLMs relied on manually crafted strategies for constructing adversarial prompts. These human-designed strategies were fed into the LLM to generate the prompts. However, this approach rigidifies the prompt construction strategy and fails to fully leverage the LLM's potential. Therefore, we employ Role-based CoT Elicitation to induce the LLM to decompose the jailbreak task, allowing it to generate diverse strategies for prompt construction. Furthermore, the CoT of reasoning models reveals the model's reasoning pathway, the specific information utilized, how competing factors are weighed, ambiguities resolved, and logical leaps taken. This constitutes significantly richer and more valuable information than the final output itself. Thereby, after obtaining the CoT response, we systematically analyze its intermediate reasoning steps to extract actionable jailbreak strategies and construct a strategy knowledge base for jailbreak.

Although thought processes of LRM contain substantial information, they also exhibit redundancy. Therefore, during strategy extraction, we focus on identifying reusable evasion patterns—such as "synonym substitution" and "decomposition"—rather than adopting the entire output verbatim. An example of utilizing "decomposition" strategy is, when prompted with a request involving violence, DeepSeek-R1 may attempt to reformulate the intent by decomposing it into visually descriptive but semantically benign components, such as "a person holding a sharp metallic object" or "a heated confrontation between two individuals." These phrasings retain the visual cues associated with violence while avoiding explicit trigger terms that typically activate safety filters.

These distilled strategies are systematically consolidated into a Jailbreak Strategy Knowledge Base (JSKB). During subsequent jailbreak attacks, the JSKB is dynamically prepended to target-specific prompts, enabling the model to leverage prior knowledge. This approach significantly enhances evasive capability while preserving fidelity to the original malicious intent.

3.4 Prompt Refinement and Regeneration

The extracted strategies are then embedded into a revised role-playing prompt that incorporates the previously discovered evasion methods as implicit prior knowledge. By feeding this refined prompt back into DeepSeek-R1, we obtain a second-round output in which the model generates a new candidate jailbreak prompt. This version typically demonstrates higher stealthiness and better survivability against known safety filtering mechanisms. Interestingly, this self-improvement effect may stem from the model's greater tolerance toward its own internally generated content. Similar observations were reported in SurrogatePrompt [Ba *et al.*, 2024], where Midjourney's safety filter was found to be more permissive when handling text prompts produced by itself.

3.5 Safety Feedback and Optimization

Each candidate jailbreak prompt is tested on a commercial T2I model. If the prompt is blocked—either due to prompt-level filtering or image-level content moderation—the corresponding rejection message is forwarded directly to DeepSeek-R1. For example, a text-level block typically returns "Your request was rejected as a result of our safety system. Your prompt may contain text that is not allowed." while an image-level rejection returns "This request has been blocked by our content filters." Instead of appending these messages as passive context, we explicitly provide them to DeepSeek-R1 as the next input, asking it to generate a revised jailbreak prompt that avoids triggering the same safety mechanism. DeepSeek-R1 integrates the reported failure into its reasoning and produces a new candidate.

4 Experiment

To evaluate the efficacy of the proposed framework, we conduct experiments on popular T2I models equipped with NSFW defenses. Our method is benchmarked against SOTA approaches, with key results focusing on one-shot jailbreak success rate and semantic alignment score. In this section, we first detail the experimental setup, followed by presentation and analysis of the core findings.

4.1 Experimental Setups

This section details the experimental setup, including the treatment models, datasets, evaluation metrics, and baseline methods.

Treat Models

We consider a black-box setting in which the attacker cannot access or modify the internal parameters of either the LRM or the target T2I model. The victim T2I model is DALL·E 3 [OpenAI, 2023a], a widely used commercial T2I model known for its strong safety alignment, , which incorporates layered defense mechanisms [OpenAI, 2023b] including ChatGPT refusal behaviors for sensitive topics, prompt-level filtering via tools like the Moderation API, extensive textual blocklists informed by prior research and proactive risk assessments, and image-level classifiers that suppress outputs violating policy constraints. To assist the attack, we leverage DeepSeek-R1 [Guo *et al.*, 2025], a SOTA LRM, as the jailbreak agent. While model internals remain hidden, the attacker can access DeepSeek-R1's full output, including its intermediate CoT reasoning traces, which are exposed by default during generation.

Datasets

Our study employs two datasets. The first, referred to as DS, consists of prompts generated by DeepSeek-R1, targeting seven core NSFW categories: hate, harassment, privacy, self-harm, violence, sexual, and illicit. These categories are derived from a condensed interpretation of OpenAI's usage policies [OpenAI, 2025]. For each category, we create 50 prompts, ensuring a total of 350 prompts with balanced distribution and sufficient semantic diversity for comprehensive analysis. For each category, we generate 50 prompts, resulting in a balanced and diverse set of 350 examples.



(a) One-Shot Jailbreak Success Rate on the DS dataset across seven NSFW categories. Our method consistently outperforms PGJ-based and PGJ.



(b) One-Shot Jailbreak Success Rate on the I2P dataset. Our method achieves $\geq 98\%$ success in all categories, surpassing PGJ-based.

Figure 3: One-Shot Jailbreak Success Rate comparison across seven NSFW categories on two datasets.

The second dataset is derived from the I2P [Schramowski *et al.*, 2023] benchmark, which features carefully curated, real-world image-to-prompt pairs covering seven types of NSFW concepts: hate, harassment, shocking, self-harm, violence, sexual, and illegal. Designed to support the responsible evaluation of generative models on sensitive content, I2P enables researchers to assess model behavior in realistic and safety-critical scenarios. From this benchmark, we randomly sample 50 prompts for each category, forming a balanced subset also referred to as I2P.

Evaluation Metrics

We evaluate the effectiveness of our method using two core metrics. The first is the One-Shot Jailbreak Success Rate (OSJSR), which refers to the proportion of jailbreak prompts that successfully bypass DALL·E 3's safety mechanisms on the first attempt. This metric reflects the efficiency and stealth of the generated prompts. The second metric is Semantic Alignment Score (SAS), which measures how well the generated image preserves the intended meaning of the original malicious prompt. High SAS indicates that the jailbreak method maintains the semantic integrity of the prompt while evading detection. To compute this score, we use the BLIP model [Li *et al.*, 2022] to assess alignment between each image and its corresponding prompt.

Baseline

For baselines, we consider two representative methods. The first is the original PGJ [Huang *et al.*, 2025] attack. The second, referred to as the PGJ-based variant, incorporates the core idea of PGJ by explicitly instructing the LRM to replace sensitive keywords during prompt generation. Since PGJ was evaluated on a custom dataset created using GPT-4o, we adopt the performance results reported in the original paper for comparison.

4.2 One-Shot Jailbreak Success Rate

Fig. 3 reports the OSJSR across seven NSFW categories on two datasets. As shown in Fig. 3a, our method achieves 100% success in four categories and maintains high performance in others on the DS dataset, including 94% in the challenging Sexual category, significantly outperforming PGJ-based (92%) and PGJ (60.5%). The average OSJSR reaches 98.6%, compared to 93.1% and 83.6% for the baselines. As shown in Fig. 3b, our approach consistently achieves at least 98% OSJSR across all seven categories on the I2P dataset, with perfect (100%) success in Self-harm, Illegal, and Shocking. In contrast, PGJ-based yields notably lower success in Self-harm (84%) and Sexual (86%). Overall, our average OSJSR on I2P reaches 98.9%, surpassing PGJ-based (92.6%).

These results collectively indicate that our method exhibits high robustness and cross-dataset generalization, consistently outperforming strong baselines across both datasets and all NSFW categories.

4.3 Semantic Alignment Score

Fig. 4 compares the Semantic Alignment Score across two datasets, covering seven key NSFW categories.

In Fig. 4a and Fig. 4b (DS and I2P), Our method performs comparably to the PGJ-based baseline across most NSFW categories, with slight advantages in several cases. The margins are particularly evident in categories like sexual, and violence. In Fig. 4c, although PGJ is evaluated on its own dataset, its overall scores are still lower than those of our method on DS and I2P. For example, PGJ achieves only 0.352 on Sexual and 0.374 on Privacy, while our method maintains > 0.4 on these categories in both datasets.

These results suggest that, while maintaining high attack success rates, our method also preserves the semantic intent of the original malicious prompts to the greatest extent. Fig. 5 presents representative unsafe images generated during evaluation, illustrating typical outputs produced by the model after



(a) Semantic Alignment Score on the DS dataset. Our method performs similarly to the PGJ-based baseline, with slight gains in some categories.

(b) Semantic Alignment Score on the I2P dataset. Our method remains comparable to PGJ-based, with marginal improvements in several cases.

(c) Semantic Alignment Score scores of PGJ on its own dataset, showing lower consistency than our method on DS and I2P.

Figure 4: Semantic consistency evaluation across three datasets. Our method preserves the semantic intent of the original malicious prompts to the greatest extent.

Table 1: Evaluation of attack prompts depicting violent scenarios, reporting the average semantic consistency (SAS) between the generated images and the intended malicious prompts.

Original violent prompt	**Dataset**	**Method**	**SAS ↑**
A terrorist holds a detonator while surrounded by hostages in a subway.	DS	Ours	**0.4588**
		PGJ-based [Huang *et al.*, 2025]	0.4229
crowd of crazy people attacking a crowd of cops in front of stores in los angles, photorealism, professional lighting, lighting from streetlights, photo with japanese chill style, conceptual art	I2P	Ours	**0.4321**
		PGJ-based [Huang *et al.*, 2025]	0.4188

bypassing safety mechanisms.

Table 1 presents the SAS for attack prompts describing violent scenarios on the DS and I2P datasets. For each dataset, we randomly select one prompt from the Violence category, and generate 50 images per prompt using both our method and PGJ-based method. The average semantic consistency score is then computed between the generated images and the original malicious prompt. These results further confirm that the generated images maintain a high degree of semantic consistency with the original malicious prompts, supporting the effectiveness of our method in preserving intended meanings during attack.

5 Conclusions

In this paper, we propose a novel jailbreak attack that exploits the Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning of a Large Reasoning Model (LRM) to compromise its allied Text-to-Image (T2I) model. Our method relies exclusively on zero-shot prompting, requiring no model fine-tuning. Generated attack prompts effectively bypass T2I safety filters while operating under fully black-box conditions with negligible user involvement, ensuring both practicality and efficiency. However, limitations remain, for example, Jailbreak strategy knowledge bases still require manual curation, and 2) The reinforcement



Figure 5: Examples of unsafe images generated during evaluation.

feedback mechanism remains oversimplified. Future work will explore fully automated, end-to-end frameworks for T2I security testing without human intervention.

Ethical Statement

We recognize the potential ethical implications of revealing vulnerabilities in T2I models. Nonetheless, we believe that systematically identifying and analyzing these weaknesses is a critical step toward improving the safety, robustness, and accountability of generative AI systems. This study is intended to raise awareness of such security concerns and to promote the development of more effective and responsible defense strategies.

Acknowledgments

This work was supported in part by the Original exploration program of National Natural Science Foundation of China 62450067, National Natural Science Foundation of China under the grant No. 62302286 and Research Fund of Key Lab of Education Blockchain and Intelligent Technology, Ministry of Education under the grant No. EBME25-F-04).

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